This paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political "fundamentals" can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, mid education finance as those. of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, with credit constraints, lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality; hence the potential for multiple study states, with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution, or vice versa.
Using cross-country estimates of physical and human capital stocks, we run the growth accounting regressions implied by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function. Our results indicate that human capital enters insignificantly in explaining per capita growth rates. We next specify an alternative model in which the growth rate of total factor productivity depends on a nation's human capital stock level. Tests of this specification do indicate a positive role for human capital.
This paper provides new measures of human capital inequality for a broad Panel of countries. Taking attainment levels from Barro and Lee (2001), we compute Gini coefficients and the distribution of education by quintiles for 108 countries over five-year intervals from 1960 to 2000. Using this new cross-country data on human capital inequality two main conclusions are obtained. First, most countries in the world have tended to reduce the inequality in human capital distribution. Second, human capital inequality measures provide more robust results than income inequality measures in the estimation of standard growth and investment equations.
Analysis of the contribution of education to growth through its role in promoting a common culture indicates that when different cultural groups separately determine the social content of their school curricula excessive polarization can result, with less than optimal growth. The optimal trajectory involves a gradual, reciprocal convergence of school curricula towards the middle ground. This may be difficult to implement in a political context in which all agents are identified with one group or another. When curricula are determined by legislative bargaining, centralization of schooling may result in overly rapid homogenization in some cases, and - perhaps surprisingly - excessive polarization in others.
Direct measures of labor-force quality from international mathematics and science test scores are strongly related to growth. Indirect specification tests are generally consistent with a causal link: direct spending on schools is unrelated to student performance differences; the estimated growth effects of improved labor-force quality hold when East Asian countries are excluded; and, finally, home-country quality differences of immigrants are directly related to U.S. earnings if the immigrants are educated in their own country but not in the United States. The last estimates of micro productivity effects, however, introduce uncertainty about the magnitude of the growth effects.
Using data from the March Current Population Survey, we document an increase over the past 30 years in wage inequality for males. Between 1963 and 1989, real average weekly wages for the least skilled workers (as measured by the tenth percentile of the wage distribution) declined by about 5 percent, whereas wages for the most skilled workers (as measured by the ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution) rose by about 40 percent. We find that the trend toward increased wage inequality is apparent within narrowly defined education and labor market experience groups. Our interpretation is that much of the increase in wage inequality for males over the last 20 years is due to increased returns to the components of skill other than years of schooling and years of labor market experience. Our primary explanation for the general rise in returns to skill is that the demand for skill rose in the United States over this period.
This paper examines the extent to which patterns of human capital convergence can account for observed patterns of income inequality between countries. The author decomposes national income into three components: one due to education levels, one reflecting the return to education, and a residual component. He then examines the contribution of each to changes in income dispersion. Among the developed countries, convergence in education levels has resulted in a reduction in income dispersion. However, for the world as a whole, incomes have diverged despite substantial convergence in education levels.
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