The goal of this paper is to present the following finding: an egalitarian policy maker might prefer higher standards than would a policy maker whose goal was to maximize the sum of earnings. The result is based on the observation that if workers are differentiated with respect to ability, an increase in educational standards will increase the earnings of both the most-able and the least-able workers. The only workers whose earnings fall are those workers who after the increase fail to continue meeting the standard.
The author models standards for educational credentials, such as high-school diplomas. Standard-setters maximize their conception of social welfare, knowing that utility-maximizing students choose whether to meet the standard. The author shows that more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards, the median voter would prefer higher standards (under symmetric distributions), and decentralization lowers standards (among identical communities). Optimal standards do not necessarily fall with increased student preference for leisure, deterioration of nonstudent inputs to education, or increased student heterogeneity. Superseding binary credentials by perfect information increases average achievement and social welfare for plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and pooling under decentralization.
School choice has become an increasingly prominent strategy for urban school districts seeking to enhance academic achievement. Evaluating the impact of such programs is complicated by the fact that a highly select sample of students takes advantage of these programs. To overcome this difficulty, we exploit randomized lotteries that determine high school admission in the Chicago Public Schools. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that attending sought after programs provides any benefit on a wide variety of traditional academic measures, including standardized test scores, attendance rates, course-taking, and credit accumulation. This is true despite the fact that those students who win the lotteries attend better high schools along a number of dimensions, including higher peer achievement levels, higher peer graduation rates, and lower levels of poverty. We do, however, uncover evidence that attendance at such schools may improve a subset of non-traditional outcome measures, such as self-reported disciplinary incidences and arrest rates.
A theoretical and computational model with tax-financed, tuition-free public schools and competitive, tuition-financed private schools is developed. Students differ by ability and income. Achievement depends on own ability and on peers' abilities. Equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of school qualities and two-dimensional student sorting with stratification by ability and income. In private schools, high-ability, low-income students receive tuition discounts, while low-ability, high-income students pay tuition premia. Tuition vouchers increase the relative size of the private sector and the extent of student sorting and benefit high-ability students relative to low-ability students.
In this paper, the authors present an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents in which human capital investment through formal schooling is the engine of growth. The authors use simple functional forms for preferences, technologies, and income distribution to highlight the distinction between economies with public education and those with private education. The authors find that income inequality declines more quickly under public education. On the other hand, private education yields greater per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently high. The authors also find that societies will choose public education if a majority of agents have incomes below average.
Even though some countries track students into differing-ability schools by age 10, others keep their entire secondary-school system comprehensive. To estimate the effects of such institutional differences in the face of country heterogeneity, we employ an international differences-in-differences approach. We identify tracking effects by comparing differences in outcome between primary and secondary school across tracked and non-tracked systems. Six international student assessments provide eight pairs of achievement contrasts for between 18 and 26 cross-country comparisons. The results suggest that early tracking increases educational inequality. While less clear, there is also a tendency for early tracking to reduce mean performance.
The Education Gap is the first book to gather a significant body of data on vouchers in multiple locations, and it reveals startling new evidence that voucher programs benefit African-American students more than participants from other ethnic groups. To explain this phenomenon, the authors point out that residential selection is the most common form of school choice available in American public education today. Since this process is likely to leave African Americans in the worst public schools, new forms of choice directed toward low-income families are most likely to benefit black students.
Many school choice proposals would enable parents to choose among public school districts in their area, though not among private schools. Theory predicts three reactions to easier choice among public schools: increased sorting of students and parents among schools; easier choice will encourage competition among schools, forcing them into higher productivity (better student performance per input); easier choice among public schools will give parents less incentive to send their children to private schools. I examine easing choice among public schools using exogenous variation in the concentration of public school districts in metropolitan areas measured by a Herfindahl index on enrollment shares. The exogenous variation is generated by topography: I derive instruments for concentration from natural boundaries (rivers) that partially determine district size. I find evidence that easier choice leads to greater productivity. Areas with greater opportunities for choice among public schools have lower per-pupil spending, lower teacher salaries, and larger classes. The same areas have better average student performance, as measured by students' educational attainment, wages, and test scores. Performance improvements are concentrated among white non-Hispanics, males, and students who have a parent with at least a high school degree. However, student performance is not worse among Hispanics,African-Americans, females, or students who do not have a parent with a high school degree.Also, student performance improves at both ends of the educational attainment distribution and test score distribution.
Proposals to use teachers' performance incentives have recently attracted considerable attention. However, there is very little experience with applying incentives in schools. This paper provides evidence on the causal effects of two programs: the first provided the school and its teachers with monetary performance incentives and the second with additional conventional resources. The assignment of schools to the two programs was not random; therefore, identification is a central issue in the empirical analysis. The empirical results suggest that schools' and teachers' group monetary incentives caused significant gains in many dimensions of students' outcomes. Endowing schools with more resources also led to improvement in student performance. However, the comparison based on cost equivalency suggests that the teachers' incentive intervention is much more cost effective.
This article examines the effect of Catholic secondary schooling on high school graduation rates, college graduation rates, and future wages. The article introduces new measures of access to Catholic schools that serve as potential instruments for Catholic school attendance. Catholic secondary schools are geographically concentrated in urban areas, and Catholic schooling does increase educational attainment significantly among urban minorities. The gains from Catholic schooling are modest for urban whites and negligible for suburban students. Related analyses suggest that urban minorities benefit greatly from access to Catholic schooling primarily because the public schools available to them are quite poor.
This paper uses general-equilibrium simulations to explore the role of residential mobility in shaping the impact of different private-school voucher policies. The simulations are derived from a three-district model of low-, middle-, and high-income school districts (calibrated to New York data) with housing stocks that vary within and across districts. In this model, it is demonstrated that school-district targeted vouchers are similar in their impact to non targeted vouchers but vastly different from vouchers targeted to low-income households. Furthermore, strong migration effects are shown to significantly improve the likely equity consequences of voucher programs.
In 1990 Wisconsin began providing vouchers to a small number of low-income students to attend nonsectarian private schools. Controlling for individual fixed-effects, I compare the test scores of students selected to attend a participating private school with those of unsuccessful applicants and other students from the Milwaukee public schools. I find that students in the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program had faster math score gains than, but similar reading score gains to, the comparison groups. The results appear robust to data imputations and sample attrition, although these deficiencies of the data should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
Nineteenth-century Catholic doctrine strongly opposed state schooling. We show that countries with larger shares of Catholics in 1900 (but without a Catholic state religion) tend to have larger shares of privately operated schools even today. We use this historical pattern as a natural experiment to estimate the causal effect of contemporary private competition on student achievement in cross-country student-level analyses. Our results show that larger shares of privately operated schools lead to better student achievement in mathematics, science and reading, and to lower total education spending, even after controlling for current Catholic shares.
This paper estimates the effects of family background, resources and institutions on mathematics and science performance using an international database of more than 260,000 students from 39 countries which includes extensive background information at the student, teacher, school and system level. The student-level estimations show that international differences in student performance cannot be attributed to resource differences but are considerably related to institutional differences. Among the many institutions which combine to yield major positive effects on student performance are centralized examinations and control mechanisms, school autonomy in personnel and process decisions, individual teacher influence over teaching methods, limits to teacher unions' influence on curriculum scope, scrutiny of students' achievement and competition from private schools.
This paper uses extensive student-level micro databases of three international student achievement tests to estimate heterogeneity in the effect of external exit examinations on student performance along three dimensions. First, quantile regressions show that the effect tends to increase with student ability-but it does not differ substantially for most measured family-background characteristics. Second, central examinations have complementary effects to school autonomy. Third, the effect of central exit examinations increases during the course of secondary education, and regular standardised examination exerts additional positive effects. Thus, there is substantial heterogeneity in the central-examination effect along student, school and time dimensions.
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