We develop a model that shows that, at the Nash equilibrium, the outcome of each individual embedded in a network is proportional to his/her Katz–Bonacich centrality measure. This measure takes into account both direct and indirect friends of each individual, but puts less weight to his/her distant friends. We then bring the model to the data using a very detailed dataset of adolescent friendship networks. We show that, after controlling for observable individual characteristics and unobservable network specific factors, a standard deviation increase in the Katz–Bonacich centrality increases the pupil school performance by more than 7% of one standard deviation.
Since the mid-1960s, many state governments have introduced subsidies for school districts that offer kindergarten. This paper uses the staggered timing and age targeting of these grants to examine how the childcare subsidy implicit in public schooling affects maternal labor supply. Using data from five Censuses, I estimate that four of ten single mothers with no younger children entered the work force with public school enrollment of a five-year-old child. No significant labor supply responses are detected among other mothers with eligible children. Results also indicate that at least one in three marginal public school enrollees would have otherwise attended private school.
Estimating the causal effect of a first child on female labor supply is complicated by the endogeneity of fertility. This paper addresses this problem by focusing on a sample of women from the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) who sought help to become pregnant. After a certain period, only some of these women gave birth. Results using this strategy show that having a first child younger than one year old reduces female employment by 26 percentage points. These estimates are close to OLS estimates from census data and to those from OLS and fixed-effects models on NSFG data.
The question of whether giving birth as a teenager has negative economic consequences for the mother remains controversial despite substantial research. In this paper, we build upon existing literature, especially the literature that uses the experience of teenagers who had a miscarriage as the appropriate comparison group. We show that miscarriages are not random events, but rather are likely correlated with (unobserved) community-level factors, casting some doubt on previous findings. Including community-level fixed effects in our specifications lead to important changes in our estimates. By making use of information on the timing of miscarriages as well as birth control choices preceding the teenage pregnancies we construct more relevant control groups for teenage mothers. We find evidence that teenage childbearing likely reduces the probability of receiving a high school diploma by 5 to 10 percentage points, reduces annual income as a young adult by $1,000 to $2,400, and may increase the probability of receiving cash assistance and decrease years of schooling.
In October 1999, the British government enacted the Working Families' Tax Credit, which aimed at encouraging work among low-income families with children. This paper uses panel data collected between 1991 and 2001 to evaluate the effect of this reform on single mothers. We find that the reform led to a substantial increase in their employment rate of about five percentage points, which was driven by both a higher rate at which lone mothers remained in the labor force and a higher rate at which they entered it. Women's responses were highly heterogeneous, with effects double this size for mothers with one preschool-aged child, and virtually no effect for mothers with multiple older children. The employment increase was accompanied by significant increases in paid childcare utilization and our analysis in fact suggests that the generous childcare credit component of the reform played a key role in explaining the estimated employment and childcare usage responses. We also find that the increase in labor market participation was accompanied by reductions in single mothers' subsequent fertility and in the rate at which they married, behavioral responses, which in turn are likely to influence the reform's overall impact on child poverty and welfare.
The literature on schooling externalities in U.S. cities and states is rather mixed: positive external effects of average education levels are hardly found while positive externalities from the share of college graduates are more often identified. We propose a simple model to reconcile this mixed evidence. Our model predicts positive externalities from increased college education and negligible external effects from high school education. Using compulsory attendance/child labor laws, push-driven immigration of highly educated workers, and the location of land-grant colleges as instruments for schooling attainments, we test and confirm the model predictions with data on U.S. states for the period 1960-2000.
We study a randomized evaluation of a merit scholarship program in which Kenyan girls who scored well on academic exams had school fees paid and received a grant. Girls showed substantial exam score gains, and teacher attendance improved in program schools. There were positive externalities for girls with low pretest scores, who were unlikely to win a scholarship. We see no evidence for weakened intrinsic motivation. There were heterogeneous program effects. In one of the two districts, there were large exam gains and positive spillovers to boys. In the other, attrition complicates estimation, but we cannot reject the hypothesis of no program effect.
We propose that signalling in professional labour markets creates product market externalities that affect wages, thus establishing a link between the externality and signalling incentives. Due to signalling activity, a free substitute (negative externality) or complement (positive externality) good appears. For negative or mildly positive externalities, the standard result of signalling at the minimum level obtains. When the positive externality is sufficiently strong, separation occurs, in contrast to the literature, at the maximum rather than at the minimum level of signalling. Very strong positive externalities imply the unique maximum pooling equilibrium. The private market solution may involve too little signalling when compared to the social optimum.
© 2004 European Expert Network on Economics of Education This e-mail address is protected against spambots. Please activate JavaScript in order to see them. | Home | Site Map | Contacts | Impressum | Printversion
